ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
he aim of this study is to examine how differently the market reacts to earnings surprises of Chaebol firms compared to those of non-Chaebol firms. Although there is no official definition of Chaebol, firms are perceived as Chaebol if they consist of a large group and operate in many different industries, maintain substantial business ties with other firms in their group, and are controlled by the largest shareholder as a whole. The definition used to identify Chaebol firms is that of a large business group established by the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) and a group of companies of which more than 30% of the shares are owned by the group's controlling shareholders and its affiliated companies. According to a report from the KFTC, 51 groups have been designated as large business groups, including 1,740 listed and non-listed firms. 1 In 2011, Chaebol firms accounted for three quarters of all market value in Korea. Chaebol firms contributed to boosting Korea's export-driven economy in recent decades and overcoming the Asian currency crisis in the late 1990s but have become a target of public criticism over their perceived abuses of economic power. Regardless of which view one holds of Chaebol firms in the Korean economy, market participants are interested in Chaebol firms. Due to the significance of Chaebol firms to the Korean economy, their decisions and strategies function as milestones of the economy. Information on Chaebol firms is easily obtained from the media and official resources such as the KFTC. This means that Chaebol firms have a better information environment than non-Chaebol firms. We examined whether the affiliation of a firm with a Chaebol group influences the sensitivity of stock prices to earnings surprises. We predicted that the Earnings Response Coefficients (ERCs) of Chaebol firms would show different patterns from those of non-Chaebol firms.
Additionally, we investigated how intra-group transactions affect the ERC of Chaebol firms and whether there is a difference with non-Chaebol firms. One of the distinct strategies of a Chaebol is decision making at the whole group level using affiliates. Even though each firm in a Chaebol group has an independent statutory status and system, they are run for the maximization of the group value, including all affiliates in the group, not for the maximization of the individual value of the firm. Park et al. (1997) found that a Chaebol firm makes decisions that maximize the size of the whole group, and the Korea Development Institute (KDI) reported on the influence of the Our results show that market response to positive (negative) earnings surprises is more positive (negative) for Chaebol firms. One possible explanation for this result can be a better information environment and less information uncertainty. Second, intra-group transactions of Chaebol firms are positively related to ERCs. Specifically, Chaebol firms with greater intra-group transactions show larger ERCs under positive earnings surprises, while they show smaller ERCs under negative earnings surprises. However, we found that intra-group transactions have no effect on the ERCs in non-Chaebol firms. This result indicates that investors expect or recognize the "propping" effect that maintains or increases the value of a firm in case of bad news from Chaebol firms.
This study contributes to the literature on Chaebol firms in two ways. First, we identified that Chaebol firms have larger ERCs than non-Chaebol firms, and this result is supported regardless of the type of news, good or bad. A previous study could not find evidence that Chaebol firms exhibit larger ERCs than non-Chaebol firms after controlling for the size effect (Lee, 1993) . Second, we extend studies on ERCs of Chaebol firms by including intragroup transactions as one of the determinants of the market response. We expect future studies to explore what causes the larger ERCs of Chaebol firms in terms of the information environment and the direct connections between intra-group transactions and "propping."
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample selection and research methodology. Section 4 reports our main results, and the final section summarizes and concludes the paper.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT

Literature on Earnings Response Coefficient
Since Ball and Brown (1968) , many financial accounting researchers have examined the ERC, which is defined as the effect of a $1 change in earnings on the dollar stock returns. The ERC is the slope coefficient for the regression of returns for the change in earnings. Major studies in the capital market area have focused on the In the same context, researchers have examined whether stock price reactions to earnings surprises are related to the quality of the reported earnings numbers (Imhoff & Lobo, 1992; Lee & Sami, 1998) . Some studies have attempted to analyze the difference in market reaction with regards to the sign of the news. For example, Basu (1997) showed that firms with positive (negative) unexpected earnings, meaning good news (bad news), have positive (negative) excess returns. In addition, Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012) found that stock price sensitivity to good earnings news is higher during high sentiment periods than during low sentiment periods, whereas stock price sensitivity to bad earnings news is higher during low sentiment periods than during high sentiment periods.
Literature on Chaebol
Due to the unique ownership structure, extant studies on Chaebol firms have focused on the relation between the value of firms and Chaebol affiliation. Ferris et al. (2003) found a negative effect of Chaebol membership on a firm's value. Lee et al. (2011) showed that high insider ownership and Chaebol affiliation reduce a firm's value. However, Kim et al. (2011) examined the influence of ownership-control disparity on a firm's value, but they could not find any significant correlation between them.
In particular, a large body of studies have examined "tunneling" and "propping" among Chaebol firms. "Tunneling" occurs when the controlling shareholders increase their wealth by transferring some value to other group firms (Johnson et al., 2000) . The tunneling effect has been reported for various situations. Bae et al. (2002) found that while the minority shareholders of a firm within a Chaebol may lose from an acquisition, the controlling shareholders benefit because the acquisition enhances the value of the other firms in the group. Baek et al. (2006) showed that Chaebol firms offering private securities to group affiliates set the offering prices to benefit their controlling shareholders. In contrast, Friedman et al. (2003) used "propping" to describe the injection of an entrepreneur's private cash into an affiliated firm with outside investors. In the same context, Riyanto and Toolsema (2008) identified "propping" as a form of inter-group insurance in case of financial distress. As evidence of recognition of "propping" by the market, Bae et al. (2008) found that the announcement of increased earnings by a Chaebol firm has a positive effect on the market value of other affiliates in the group.
Studying the market's evaluation of Chaebol affiliation, Lee (1993) reported that Chaebol firms exhibit larger ERCs than non-affiliated firms due to the monopoly power of Chaebol firms. However, after controlling for size, Chaebol firms did not show any significant correlation. On the other hand, Yoon and Huh (1998) reported that growth and Chaebol affiliation have a positive effect on ERC.
Literature on Intra-Group Transactions
According to IAS 24, a person or entity is related to a reporting entity if that person or entity has control or joint control of the reporting entity, or if that person or entity has significant influence over the reporting entity. As such, we can define intra-group transactions as transactions among firms in the same Chaebol group. The controlling shareholder of the Chaebol group has substantial power to make decisions at the whole group level and an incentive to maximize its wealth by managing earnings through intra-group transactions.
Extant studies have examined the effect of intra-group transactions on the aspects of earnings management and market response. Kim and Woo (2008) examined the relationship between the transactions of related parties and earnings management. They found that discretionary accruals become larger as the transactions of related parties increase. In addition, the ERC is smaller when the size of the transactions of related parties is relatively large, which implies that the investors evaluate the transactions of related parties negatively. Choi (2010) examined the association between the transactions of related parties, such as the sale of goods and credit offerings among affiliates and stock return. The results showed that the sales of the related party are not related to stock returns, while the accounts receivables of the related party are negatively correlated with stock price. The Clute Institute Chang et al. (2000) examined the economic performance of Chaebol firms by explicitly addressing group wide resource-sharing and intra-group transactions. The results showed that group-affiliated firms benefit from group membership because they share intangible assets and financial resources with other member firms. Lee (2006) reported a negative effect of the transactions of related parties on a firm's value regardless of Chaebol affiliation. This is inconsistent with Kim and Woo's (2008) study, which did not find a negative evaluation of the market for Chaebol firms.
Hypotheses Development
Investors make decisions based on available information and are affected by behavioral biases. Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012) found that market-wide investor sentiment influences the stock price sensitivity to firmspecific earnings news, which implies the existence of behavioral biases by investors. Specifically, the ERC for good earnings news is higher during high sentiment periods than during low sentiment periods, whereas the ERC for bad earnings news is higher during low sentiment periods than during high sentiment periods. Similarly, whether a firm is a member of a Chaebol affects the response of investors to earnings surprises after controlling for other determinants of ERC such as size and risks. Chaebol firms receive more attention from the public, including investors and regulators, than non-Chaebol firms. Therefore, investors are able to access information about Chaebol firms not only from annual reports but also from the media without consuming considerable time and effort. 3 Given the more available information compared to non-Chaebol firms, we expect that information uncertainty can be reduced for Chaebol firms.
Hypothesis 1:
The ERC of a Chaebol firm for positive (negative) earnings surprises is significantly different from that of a non-Chaebol firm.
A Chaebol establishes its goals and executes its strategies at the group level rather than at the individual firm level. This implies that a large portion of intra-group transactions can be used to adjust the performance of individual firms to achieve operational and financial goals intended by the controlling shareholders. Chaebol firms are exposed to the risk of "tunneling" and to the advantage of "propping" facilitated by intra-group transactions. Intra-group transactions can decrease the value of a firm because of the controlling shareholders' pursuit of private profit (called "tunneling") and cause a negative market response to earnings news. On the other hand, intra-group transactions are used to prop up distressed firms or relatively weak affiliated firms by supporting their operations or making additional investments.
However, intra-group transactions are not an exclusive strategy of Chaebol firms. Non-Chaebol firms also have various types of related parties, including subsidiaries and associates, involved in related party transactions. Kim and Woo (2008) analyzed a single regression irrespective of the sign of earnings surprises and found that the ERC is lower when the size of the related party transactions is large. This result indicates that investors evaluate the related party transactions negatively. However, this result is only applicable to non-Chaebol firms and implies that the intra-group transactions of non-Chaebol firms deliver different signals to investors due to the limited information available compared to Chaebol firms.
Due to the mixed effects of "tunneling" and "propping" of Chaebol firms, we do not predict the direction of the net effect of intra-group transactions on the ERC. Additionally, we predict that how and to what extent intragroup transactions affect ERCs are different depending on the sign of the earnings surprises and whether a firm belongs to a Chaebol.
Hypothesis 2a:
The ERCs of Chaebol (non-Chaebol) firms vary depending on intra-group transactions. Hypothesis 2b: The effects of intra-group transactions on the ERCs of Chaebol (non-Chaebol) firms for positive earnings surprises are different from the ERCs for negative earnings surprises. The Clute Institute
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
To examine whether Chaebol firms have different ERCs for earnings surprises compared to non-Chaebol firms, we constructed basic Model (1). Then, to investigate ERCs for positive and negative earnings surprises separately, we developed basic Model (1) SAR is the size adjusted return cumulated over a 12-month period ending three months after the company's fiscal year-end. We selected this period to ensure that information on earnings surprises and intra-group transactions reported in the firm's annual report is available to the market. SAR is free of the size effect because these returns are computed after subtracting the returns on a portfolio of stocks that are similar in size. CHAEBOL is an indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if a firm is an affiliate of a Chaebol group. The ERC of a Chaebol firm is the sum of b 1 and b 2 . We included LEV as a control variable to reflect the result of a previous study that showed low leveraged firms have a larger ERC than that of high leveraged firms (Dahliwal et al., 1991) . In addition, we added SIZE and BM into the model to control for the effects of firm size and growth on the ERC (Collins & Kothari, 1989 ). Finally, we included an indicator variable MK to identify in which market a firm is listed to control for market specific effects.
To test Hypothesis 2, we estimated Model (2) including TRANS. TRANS is an indicator variable that represents whether the size of the intra-group transactions is larger than the median of the total samples' intra-group transactions. We measured the intra-group transactions by calculating the net effect of the intra-group transaction on a firm's profitability. Specifically, we deducted the purchases and expenses from the revenue and other gains and then, scaled this by the total revenue of the firm. We included the same control variables as in Model (1) 
SAMPLE AND RESEARCH DESIGN
Sample Selection
Our sample consisted of firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) and the Korea Securities Dealers Automated (KOSDAQ) during the period 2001-2011. We obtained financial data from KIS-VALUE, which provides the financial statements of all listed firms, and analyst forecasts from the Fn-Guide. For comparability, we deleted firms with non-December fiscal year-ends and all firms in which total liabilities were larger than the total assets. This screening procedure yielded a total of 10,794 firm-year observations. Table 1 presents the sample selection criteria and the number of excluded firms to arrive at our final sample. 
Definition of Chaebol
Each year, the KFTC ranks business groups by the size of their total assets and identifies the 30 largest groups. We used the website operated by the Korean Fair Trade Commission to obtain a list of Chaebol firms. Table  2 presents the distribution of our sample firms (Chaebol and non-Chaebol). As can be seen in Panel A, a total of 1,631 firms are classified as Chaebol firms and account for 15 percent of our sample. In addition, Panel A shows that 86% of the Chaebol firms are listed on the KSE, whereas the portion of non-Chaebol firms listed on the KSE is only 45%. In Panel B of Table 2 , we summarize the industrial composition of our sample. The Clute Institute Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analyses. Size-adjusted returns, SARi,t, have been winsorized at 1 percent and 99 percent of the respective distribution to mitigate the impact of outliers. The mean of the size-adjusted returns was 0.048, which represents the average response to positive, negative, and no-news surprises. The positive mean of 0.008 for earnings surprises, UE , indicates that the earnings news have, on average, been positive. However, when we divide the sample into positive and negative earnings surprises, we note that the mean magnitude of the two sub-groups, UEUP[>0] and UEDOWN[<0], was 0.077, -0.072, respectively, suggesting that the overall positive mean of UE is due to the greater preponderance of positive news in our sample. CHAEBOL is an indicator set to 1 if the firm is a Chaebol firm and 0 otherwise. The mean CHAEBOL was 0.151. This finding suggests that about 15 percent of our sample firms are classified as Chaebol firms. Table 3 also provides statistics on the control variable. The control variables include measures such as firm size (SIZE) measured as the natural logarithm of the total assets, the market-to-book ratio (MB), an indicator set to 1 if the firms are listed on the KSE and 0 otherwise (MK), and a leverage as the total debt divided by the net assets (LEV). To control or mitigate industry and time-series effects, we added an industry dummy and year dummy for the regression analysis. The Clute Institute Note: The sample consists of 10,794 firms between 2001 and 2011. All firms are publicly traded. SAR is the size adjusted return cumulated over the 12-month period ending three months after the company's fiscal year-end. SAR is free of the size effect because these returns are computed after subtracting the returns on a portfolio of stocks that are similar in size. The control variables include measures such as firm size (SIZE) measured as the natural logarithm of the total assets, the market-tobook ratio (MB), an indicator set to 1 if the firms listed on the KSE and 0 otherwise (MK), and a leverage as the total debt divided by the net assets (LEV). To control or mitigate industry and time-series effects, we added an industry dummy and year dummy for the repression analysis. Table 4 provides the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficient for the various combinations of control and test variables. SAR is significantly positively correlated with CHAEBOL. SAR is significantly correlated with TRANS, LEV, and MK with a negative sign. Table 5 reports the results of the univariate tests on the differences between Chaebol firms and nonChaebol firms. Firm size, measured by market capitalization and total assets, is much larger for Chaebol firms than for non-Chaebol firms. This is consistent with the market distribution of Chaebol firms skewed to the KSE. In addition, SAR is significantly larger for Chaebol firms (0.078) than for non-Chaebol firms (0.043). Leverage measured by the ratio of the total debt to the market value of equity is also significantly different between the groups. The mean (median) leverage ratios for Chaebol firms and non-Chaebol firms are 1.327 (1.030) and 1.041 (0.706), respectively. The mean (median) TRANS for Chaebol firms and non-Chaebol firms are 0.070 (0.007) and 0.014 (-0.001), which indicates that Chaebol firms execute more intra-group transactions. These differences are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. However, UE and BM are not significantly different between the groups. The definition of variables is described in Table 3 . ***, **, * represent p < .01, p < .05, and p < .10, respectively (two-tailed). The Clute Institute Table 6 presents the results for the test of our first hypothesis from the regression analysis based on Equations (1), (1a), and (1b). The coefficients of UE, UEUP, and UEDOWN capture the stock price response to earnings surprises in the case of non-Chaebol firms. Our primary focus in Table 6 is on the interactions of UE (UP and DOWN) and Chaebol that capture the differences in the ERC between Chaebol and non-Chaebol firms. The positive coefficient of the interaction variables indicates that the stock price changes more when a firm belongs to a Chaebol. We predict that the ERC of a Chaebol firm for positive (negative) earnings surprises will be significantly different from that of a non-Chaebol firm. As seen in Table 6 , before partitioning the sample according to the sign of the earnings surprises, we run the regression analysis by including the whole sample. The first two columns of Table  6 show that both coefficients of UE and the interaction of UE and Chaebol are positive. The positive coefficient of UE is consistent with a large body of prior literature stating that earnings surprises cause a significant response from stock prices. The positive coefficient of the interaction of the UE and Chaebol indicates that the market response to earnings surprises is stronger for Chaebol firms. This result is still supported when we divided our total sample into two sub-groups: one group with positive earnings surprises and the other group with negative earnings surprises. The results show that both coefficients for the UEUP × CHAEBOL and UEDOWN × CHAEBOL are significantly positive (significant at the 1% level). This means that the stock price of Chaebol firms increase more when there are positive earnings surprises, whereas it declines more in the case of negative earnings surprises.
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis
Regression Analysis
In summary, our results are consistent with our expectation that investors react differently to the earnings surprises of Chaebol firms. One possible explanation for the greater reaction to news on Chaebol firms could be because of a better information environment formed by a greater following of analysts and more interests from the media. In addition, it can be inferred that "tunneling" or "propping" intended by controlling shareholders affects the decisions of investors. By examining our second hypothesis which includes intra-group transactions as an additional explanation variable, we will further discuss "tunneling" and "propping."
Next, we examine whether market reactions vary depending on intra-group transactions. We estimated equations (2), (2a), and (2b), respectively, for Chaebol firms and non-Chaebol firms. Intra-group transactions are perceived by external auditors and regulators as risk areas where a material misstatement could occur. As such, we expect that market participants respond to earnings surprises differently by evaluating the nature and size of the intra-group transactions. Hypothesis 2a predicts that intra-group transactions affect the ERCs of the Chaebol (NonChaebol) firms. Furthermore, we expect that the effects of the intra-group transactions are different according to the sign of earnings surprises as stated by Hypothesis 2b. Table 7 shows the results separately for Chaebol firms and non-Chaebol firms. The coefficients of the UE × TRANS are positive for both Chaebol firms and non-Chaebol firms, which means that the market reaction to earnings surprises is greater with larger intra-group transitions. This is consistent with our prediction that the level of intra-group transactions differentiates ERCs. When we run the regression analysis of (2a) and (2b) for each subgroup, the results show different implications for Chaebol firms and non-Chaebol firms.
The coefficient of UEUP × TRANS for Chaebol firms under positive earnings surprises is significantly positive, whereas that for non-Chaebol firms does not show any statistically meaningful relation. The result suggests that the market interprets earnings surprises with large intra-group transactions positively only in the case of Chaebol firms. This difference is also found in negative earnings surprises. As can be seen in the Table 7 on the left side, the coefficient of UEDOWN × TRANS is significantly negative, which means that the market reacts weaker to negative earnings surprises of Chaebol firms when there are large intra-group transactions. However, we cannot find the same results from the analysis of non-chaebol firms. From the different responses of the market to negative earnings surprises, "propping" effects can be inferred. This can be interpreted as investors of Chaebol firms do not evaluate earnings surprises negatively as much as those of non-Chaebol firms do because they expect that Chaebol firms receive operational or financial support from other affiliates in the Chaebol group. Those types of support are provided in the form of intra-group transactions. 
